The advanced development of the Internet facilitates efficient information exchange while also been exploited by adversaries. Intrusion detection system is an important defense component of network security that has always been widely studied in security research. However, the research of intrusion prediction, which is more critical for network security, received less attention. General research methods regarding prediction are analyzing short term of system-calls to predict forthcoming abnormal behaviors. However, those approaches have poor accuracy due to their limited sequence dependency. To solve this problem, in this paper, we take advantage of the remarkable performance of recurrent neural networks in dealing with long sequential problems, introducing the sequence-to-sequence model into our intrusion prediction work. By semantically modeling system-calls, we build a robust system-call sequence-to-sequence prediction model. Our prediction model predicts a sequence of system-calls that will be executed in the future, which will enable the monitoring of system state and the prediction of attack behavior. The experiments show that the prediction method proposed in this paper achieved well prediction performance on ADFA-LD intrusion detection test data set. Moreover, the predicted sequence, combined with the known invoked traces of system call, significantly improves the performance of intrusion detection verified on various classifiers. INDEX TERMS Intrusion prediction, anomaly intrusion detection, recurrent neural networks, sequence-tosequence, system-call.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection system (IDS) [1] are critical components with respect to security defenses of the networks. Traditional IDSs, signature-based or anomaly-based, adopt intrusion detection technology based on certain model patterns. Signature-based methods match the system behaviors against the known attack patterns, while anomaly-based techniques build the system behavior models through prior knowledge to identify deviations. Both methods possess vulnerabilities, signature-based IDS lack the ability to detect zero-day attack, and the anomaly-based IDS receive criticisms for its inherent property of yielding high false alarm rate.
General IDSs alert intrusion behaviors without giving any extra information. When intrusion detected, the usual response is to turn off the service. However, this will impose significant adverse effect on the availability of the system. In real network environment, the normal operations of the service node are vital to the system, any hostile attacks that destruct the service running will result in huge amount of asset loss. Therefore, it needs methods to monitor the program running status and predict the possible intrusion behaviors that would threat the stability and health of the networks. This is what motivates us to carry out the prediction work in this paper. Once an intrusion detected in the system, we can predict the subsequent attack behavior of the intruder based on the sequence of system calls that have executed.
Analyzing system-call traces which invoked by the running programs to discriminate normal and abnormal behaviors was first introduced by Forrest et al. [2] . Due to the complexity and diversity of user behavior, the previous abnormal intrusion detection method for constructing normal behavior patterns is very unstable. Then in their subsequent works, they defined normal profile using short sequences of systemcalls. With the deep neural networks [3] gained state-of-theart performance in dealing with computer vision and natural language processing problems, researchers recently introduce neural networks in system call modeling [4] . However, most of them are dealing the frequency features of individual system-calls. In other words, they did not consider the semantic meaning of system-calls. More importantly, those methods cannot to identify the intrusion intention of the malicious attacks. The concern of system-calls has been a vital research target of intrusion detection and the system-call sequences imply the program characteristics. Our work implements on the system-call sequences.
System-call prediction [3] is hard for the arbitrary execute of those running programs, previous works use dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) or hidden Markov model (HMM) to predict sliding windowed system-calls. Those algorithms have long been criticized for their difficulty in calculation and the poor performance which caused by their short dependency on previous system-calls.
To solve the above problems, we construct an end-to-end system-call prediction model, which predicts the follow-up invoked system-calls based on the system-call traces that have executed during the malicious process running. The predicted sequence is what the attack program is most likely to execute within a certain period of time.
Much like human communicate with each other through languages constructed with certain grammar and syntax, processes achieve their intentions with specific system-call sequences. With the high similarity between natural human languages and system-call sequences, we employ the language model [6] to model the system calls. Because RNN is suitable for solving sequential problems, and it has significant performance in natural language processing research, such as question-answer and machine translation, we take advantages of the RNNs' sequence-to-sequence framework [7] to construct our system-call sequence prediction model.
The advantage of the method proposed in this paper lies in that it not only detects the malicious system-call sequence in real time, also predicts the possible executed system-call sequence at the next moment based on the given context. Most important of all, our work models the semantic meaning of system calls so that we can analyze sequences in sentence level. We can extract the abstract features of the system-call traces, thereby enhancing the accuracy and robustness of the anomaly detection. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Employing RNNs language model to model systemcalls addressing the long temporal dependency problem, applying sequence-to-sequence framework to generate predicted sequences conditioned on the given system-call context. 2) Improving the performance of anomaly intrusion detection with lower false alarm rate by using the predicted sequences as a supplement. 3) Addressing the defect of the anomaly intrusion detection system that cannot to make intrusion prediction and identify the intrusion intention of the malicious adversary by constructing the system-call sequence predict model. The follow-up parts of this article will organize as follows: Section II. Describes relate work. Section III. Explains our prediction model in detail. Section IV. Experiments and analysis of results, and Section V. Conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK A. INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREDICTION
Dorothy et al. [1] , Forrest et al. [2] first introduced system calls into anomaly intrusion system research works. In their proposed methods, the 'normal' was defined by short-range correlations in a process's system call. Later they detected intrusions with short system-call sequences. Neural networks have recently been applied to improve the performance of intrusion detection systems [7] - [9] . Staudemeyer and Trivedi [8] applied LSTM neural network to intrusion detection and achieved preferable results on KDD cup99 dataset. Staudemeyer and Omlin [9] further introduced the RNNs language model into anomaly intrusion detection system construct and outperformed previous methods. However, as fore mentioned, those intrusion detection technologies can only determine the intrusion activities that have occurred, nevertheless have no ability to neither forewarn the forthcoming invasion nor predict the subsequent behavior of the malwares. Actually, the difference between our work and the reference is that StaudemeyerKim and Omlin [9] are mainly to model the normal system call sequence and construct a normal behavior pattern, and our work is to use neural networks to extract attack features then predict the attack behavior. The prediction will be more important in implementing attack defense, especially in the face of multi-step attacks.
With respect to intrusion prediction, Kim et al. [10] proposed dynamic Bayesian networks to predict the subsequent actions and analyze intentions of the intruders based on system-calls. Feng et al. [11] developed a hidden semi-Markov model method for predicting the anomaly events and the intentions of possible intruders to a computer system based on the observation of system-call sequences. Qiao et al. [13] constructed a network attack graph based on correlation analysis of large intrusion alerts then calculated the probability of each attack scenario in the graph node, that is, the probability of each attack scenario as a precursor to a future attack scenario. Most researchers use Hidden Markov Models [11] , [12] to associate observed status with aggressive behaviors and use the transition probabilities to predict the next stage of intrusion behavior. There are quite a number of weaknesses in this approach. The first is the limited dependence on the sequence. The information on which the next attack based only within limited steps. This will inevitably lose certain important information that contribute to the prediction result. Second, HMM can easily converge to local optimal point, which makes it difficult to find the accuracy prediction results.
B. RNNS LANGUAGE MODEL
Recurrent neural networks have natural advantages in dealing with sequential data for its introducing cycles in their computational graph. The recurrent neural network contains a hidden state whose value is determined by the current time step input and the hidden state value of the previous time. Therefore, the output of each time step of the RNNs contains the information about the past inputs. If the recurrent neural network is expanded according to time series, it can be seen as a neural network whose depth is the length of the sequential inputs, and inputs of each hidden layer are the corresponding time step of original sequential data and the output of the previous layer. Figure 1 shows the simple structure of recurrent neural networks.
Vanilla recurrent neural networks are trained using Backpropagation through time (BPTT) [14] , [15] algorithm, and it can in principle memorize information for infinitely long sequence. However, training models with long inputs will suffer from the problems of gradient vanishing or gradient explosion [15] , [16] . The long short-term memory (LSTM) [17] and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [18] memory networks have the ability to remember important information of the long sequence by training the parameters of the input gate, forget gate, and output gate, which solving the problem of longterm dependency to a certain extent. Compared with LSTM, GRU has a simpler structure and can reduce the parameters needed to train. [19] Cho et al. [19] evaluated GRU in various data set to found that it achieved the same performance against LSTM. For this reason, in this paper we choose GRU as the RNNs implement unit in our system-call prediction model.
The language model [20] can be expressed as the probability of a word sequence be a sensible sentence, and the language model can be represented by the conditioned probability of the next word given all the previous ones. The formula is as follows:
where w t stands for the t th word in the sequence, and T = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ) is the given sentence. The recurrent neural network language model [21] has achieved great success in the fields of text generation and machine translation. It is an important part of the sequence-to-sequence model and determines the semantic rationality of the predicted word sequence. Taking the advantage of the generality nature of RNNs language model, we employ it to the system-call generation situation in this paper. 
III. SYSTEM-CALL SEQUENCE-TO-SEQUENCE MODEL A. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
The System-call Sequence-to-sequence model is modeling system-calls with sequence-to-sequence approach. Figure 2 shows the overview of our proposed mothed, there are mainly two parts of our method. First, to fulfill our object of solving the shortcomings of anomaly detection systems as well as handling the short dependency problems in existed system-call prediction algorithms, we propose a sequence-tosequence system-call prediction model. Second, to improve the performance of baseline intrusion detection classifiers, we combine the predicted sequence as a supplementary part with invoked sequence to form an extended input. As show in figure 2 , the predicted sequence supplies the classifiers extra information to enhance the ability to define the systemcall sequence nature.
B. PREDICTION MODEL
We treat the system-call traces generated during program execution as language sentences which used by the process to communicate with operation system. We apply the RNNs language model as the system-call generator to ensure that it produces semantically reasonable sequences. By introducing the sequence-to-sequence framework which well performed in natural language processing, we feed the input system-call sequence as the context information to generate the correct prediction output related to the input sequence.
The sequence-to-sequence model is essentially a RNNs implementation of the encoder-decoder framework [22] that can be thought of as a mapping between sequences. Machine translation is a mapping between one language sentence to another, and the question-answer system is sentence mapping between the same languages.
The idea of encoder and decoder is a simulation of the way that human thinks. When answering a question, we usually understand the question first, and then construct the answer statement based on the content we understand. In the same way, we divide a system-call trace into two segments according to its invoking order. We can treat the first part, which we call it source sequence, as a question statement in a questionanswer system, and the second part, called target, as an answer statement. Based on this idea, we construct the training data set of the sequence-to-sequence model. We divide 80% of the data set for training and 20% for evaluating. Generally, a vocabulary is necessary to accommodate all the words that may appear in the sentence. Similarly, we need to construct corresponding system-call word vocabulary when using the sequence-to-sequence prediction model. It is certain that the total number of system-calls in the host is determined, assuming that is m. We define S as a set of all system calls provided in an operating system. We number each system call, then get the total S = {1, 2, . . . , m}.
The source system-call sequence then will be represented as: s = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), then the target as: t = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ), where x i , y j ∈ S.
We analyze in detail about how our sequence-to-sequence system-call prediction model working. As shown in figure 3, given a system-call sequence (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), the encoder completes a forward propagation compute to generate the hidden state and output at each moment in time. The formula is as follows:
The hidden state h t of the last moment was token as the encoded information vector c of the input system-call sequence. We call it the context vector, which will be used as the initial hidden state of the decoder and will affect each moment of the output of the decoder.
The decoder generates the target sequence t according to the context vector c, the decoder itself is essentially a standard recurrent neural network language model aforementioned, and the initial hidden state of the decoder is the context vector c. The process of generating each system-call requires the participation of hidden state H t , also the system-call y t y t decoded at the previous moment. The condition probability of the decoder as follows:
Although the model architecture shown in figure 3 possesses certain capability to mapping sequence, there still some shortcomings. First, the input sentence information is encoded into a fixed vector in the encoding stage, which leads to the loss of certain information, the system-calls lying in the back position of input sequence may dilute the information of the previous ones. Second, the context vector c relied during decoding process is constant. That is to say, each systemcall in the source sequence is viewed as the same without emphasis in the process of decoding. In fact, we think that some specific system-calls will better reflect the program's intentions. Therefore, in order to emphasize the impact of those system-calls to the specific system-call decoding, we introduce the attention mechanism [22] into our system-call sequence prediction model.
The model with attention mechanism introduced has no change during the encoding stage. In the decoding stage, it will no longer relies on the context vector c, but instead takes account of the information of the inputs which are most contributed when decoding each system-call. The architecture of model with attention is shown in figure 4 . Then the conditioned probability formula of decoder changed:
where c i stand for the current context information vector which calculated with attention algorithm learned during training and is calculated as the follows:
where a ij is normalized coefficient which weight each hidden state h j of time step j contribute to the current context vector c i and a ij is calculated as:
where e ij stands for the association relationship between the input element x i and the current output element y i , which should be learned during the training phase. By introducing attention mechanism, we enable the model to emphasize the influence of a particular system-call on the nature of a sequence, so it can better predict the actions that are most likely to occur in the next stage of the call sequence.
The performance of RNNs is relevant to the scale of training data set. To make sure that our model can predict both normal and abnormal system call sequence, we employ both the attack traces and normal training traces in ADFA-LD dataset to build our training and testing set. In order to prevent the model from biasing towards the normal sequence, we maintain the ratio of the normal traces to the attack traces at 1. In fact, because the abnormal system-call traces are less than the normal, the training input data constructed with ADFA-LD is slightly insufficient. For example, if we choose a sequence length of 25, we can only gain around 5000 pairs of input sequences. The approach we take to augment training data is to construct different training sequences by adjusting the length of system-call traces. We construct data set with sequence length of 10, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 25 and 30, respectively. In the end, we got more than 60,000 training data. Table 1 shows the detail about our data. On the other hand, the system-call traces during an intrusion period are confused with some other processes, and the start and the termination boundary of a certain process are ambiguous. Therefore, it is necessary to take a longer sequence to extract the attack characteristics. By changing the length of the sequence, we can better capture the characteristics of the specific running process and achieve better predict results.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
We evaluate our model on our constructing evaluating data set. We apply the bilingual evaluation understudy (BLEU) [23] score, a benchmark widely used in machine translation, to evaluate our model performance. Also, we calculate the Euclidean distance of the encoded semantic vector between the model output and target. In addition, the TD-IDF algorithm is employed in our work to evaluate the similarity between the predicted sequence and the target.
In general, there are differences between the sequence predicted and the sequence of the real system-call. The systemcall traces are affected by the processes running on the system, the hardware of the services, and the duration of the intrusion activities. However, it can be determined that the properties of system-call sequence predicted for a particular attack is consistence with the target sequence. To verify that our model predicts sequences with the same functionality of the target, we employ multiple anomaly detection classifiers to evaluate the predicted sequences. The results denote that our model well predicted the follow-up actions of those intrusion programs. What's more, we analyze the sequences which are composed of the predicted and the invoked to enhance the performance of anomaly intrusion detection, which means that our model has the ability to foresee the upcoming intrusions.
A. DATASET
The training data is constructed on the ADFA-LD [23] , provided by The University of New South Wales, Australian Compared to the early UNM and DARPA data sets, ADFA is the latest. The attack pattern of experiment is more in line with the modern attack means, which indicates that the data is more consistent with the actual network environment. And the scale of the data set is large enough to be suitable for training neural network. The ADFA-LD data set is mainly to solve the problem which the early intrusion detection evaluation data set is not consistent with actual network environment. Creech and Hu [24] introduces the structure, generation and experiment process of the ADFA-LD in detail, then their subsequent work [25] proposed a semantic approach to anomaly intrusion detection using system-call patterns. In [26] , they proposed algorithm to build a host-based anomaly IDS, and preliminarily analyzed the data set.
B. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In the training of neural networks, the selection of hyperparameters often plays a critical role in the model convergence. The hyper parameters include:
1) The initialization of training model parameters.
2) Learning rate.
3) The batch size for min-batch optimization. 4) Dropout applied to regularize model. 5) The number of neural nodes in the hidden layer of neural network. There is no theoretical method to guide the determination of hyper parameters in the literature regarding deep learning. In general, there is a certain kind of experience to determine the appropriate hyper parameters for the model. For example, in the initialization of the parameters, the smaller random numbers distributed near 0 are generally chosen, and the learning rate can be decreased during the training iteration.
In our experiment, four models with various structures are trained as prediction models, including GRU unit of single hidden layer, two hidden layers and three hidden layers with learning rate of 0.001, and three hidden layers with learning rate of 0.1 respectively. The number of neural nodes in hidden layers of each model is 256, and the input dimension keeps the same with the hidden layer, which is due to the output of the GRU hidden layer is the input of the next layer. At the same time, the dropout is set to 0.5 to regularize the model. The maximum gradient clipped threshold is set to 5. The size of the training batch is 64. We adapt the early stop method to train models, when the current training loss no longer declines, the training is completed. The bucket strategy is employed to put the similar length sequence into the same size bucket to make the neural network training more efficient.
We train our model on GTX1050Ti GPU devices. The final perplex of the three-layer model is under 0.4 after training 48 hours. The optimizer we use is Adam with an initial learning rate of 0.1. Adam is the most advanced optimization algorithm available, and it is true in our experiments.
The dropout is employed to the output of hidden layer to regularize our model. We also use weight decay to avoid overfitting. The embedding was initialized use truncated normal and we get the word embeddings after the training. We use greedy search to generate our predict sequence after the model trained.
C. RESULT ANALYSIS
First, we use the BLEU score to evaluate our trained model performance. We use the target sequence in the test set as reference sequence. The BLEU of the prediction sequence is calculated for different models of the hyper-parameters. Table 3 denotes that when the learning rate keeping the same, the difference of BLEU score between the number of hidden layers in the model is huge, which demonstrates that the increase of hidden layers can result in better performance. On the other hand, we can see that the difference of the initial learning rate in this experiment did not much affect the convergence of the model. It can be explained that we adopted the strategy that dynamically reduces the learning rate during training phase according to the training loss. According to the results, we can set a relatively large learning rate to accelerate the convergence speed of the model and reduce the training time.
In addition, the various lengths of input sequences are adopted to enhance the robustness of the model. We classify the sequence according to the length and calculate the BLEU score.
According to figure 5, we can see that the value of BLEU is positive proportion to the input length, which means that our prediction model obtains more effective information by increasing the length of the input sequence, so that the results can be predicted more accurately. When the sequence length continues to grow, the BLEU value will decline, which is due to the limitation of GRU memory, the system-call back position in the sequence dilute the information of the previous system calls causing the loss of information, and then the prediction errors increased. Therefore, when using the model, one need to choose appropriate length of the system-call sequence as input. The blue line standing for single hidden GRU layer gains the much lower BLEU score than others. That indicated that single hidden layer network can't learn effective features and we trained them for compare.
In fact, the BLEU indicators consider mainly the number of co-occurrences of N-tuples in the predicted sequence and the target sequence. The semantic information of the sequence is not considered. Generally speaking, there are key words existed in a sentence. Similarly, we deem that some specific sequences of system-call determine the characteristic of certain sequence. The TF-IDF (term frequencyinverse document frequency) model which widely used in information retrieval and data mining can well help us find the system calls that contribute to identify the sequence. This model extracts the key words of the statement by weighting the sequence specific words. We measure the similarity between the predicted sequence and the target sequence by this method. Figure 6 (a) demonstrates that the predicted sequence well coincides with the target sequence in some syntactic level.
The disadvantage of both BLEU and TF-IDF is that only the text similarity is considered, BLEU considers the number of N-tuples in the two sequence, and TF-IDF considers the similarity of the sentence key words. However, the similarity measure of sequence semantics can better evaluate the correlation of the two sequences. We take the final hidden state as the semantic encoding vector v 1 of prediction sequence, we then do the same operation of the target sequence to get the corresponding semantic vector v 2 . Then, we calculate the cosine value between the vectors. Based on the result of figure 6, we demonstrate that the predicted system-call sequences of the model are very close to the target sequences both the syntactic and the semantic level in certain range of prediction length. It is worth noting that the line representing the single-layer model has always performed poorly in all evaluation methods, and the most obvious when the training length is 25 as we can clearly see from Figure 6 (b). The result is attributed to the fact that the single-layer model does not fit the correct model function very well. When we deepen the number of layers in the model, we can get good training results. In fact, you can think of it as a failure model, we just use it to show the process of constructing our model.
One critical evaluation criterion of the predicted sequence is that it should keep the same functionality with the target, in other words, it should gain the similar performance tested under baseline intrusion detect classifiers. In order to verify our model, we evaluated the predicted sequence using classifiers including CNNs, RNNs, SVM and Random Forest. The ROC curve is applied to measure the detect performance of the predicted sequence. Figure 7 demonstrate that the predicted sequences show the remarkable performance towards those classifiers. Compare with the reference target sequence, the AUC score is with little decline of average 0.1, that means that our model well predicts the most likely systemcall sequence with a high accuracy with regarding to sequence functionality.
D. ENHANCEMENT OF ANOMALY DETECTION
The predicted system call sequence can be used in a variety of scenarios. For example, an important benefit of predict model is that, with the predicted sequence, the anomaly detect system improve the intrusion detect ability with combining the original sequence.
We find from figure 8 that the extended sequence performs better than the original target sequence in all baseline classifiers. We argue that this is because our prediction sequence captures the abnormal behavior characteristics of the existing sequence and predicts the sequence of subsequent behavior reasonably, thus helps the classification model to make better anomaly detection.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to solve the defects of the IDSs that are unable to predict intrusion behavior, the recurrent neural network sequence-to-sequence framework is introduced into our work. With the trained model, we can efficiently predict the reliable system-call sequence according to the invoked system-call sequence during the process running. The model is validated by evaluate the predict accuracy through various benchmark methods. On the other hand, by extending the system-calls sequence with the model predicted sequence we improve significantly the performance of anomaly detection algorithms. Future works will include enhancing the model robustness against adversarial samples and validating the portability performance on other data sets of our prediction model.
